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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
instances. This trend of modifying the rule of immunity is actu-
ally doing away with the reason behind the rule. Is it not doing
away with the purpose of protecting the trust funds to impose
liability in any instance? In the interest of justice and public
policy there should be tort liability placed on charities. It seems
to be the trend of the cases to place liability on these organizations.
Examples of cases denying immunity are: Goldman v. Winkelstein,
263 App. Div. 958, 32 N.Y.S.2d 949 (2d Dep't 1942); Humphreys
v. San Francisco Area Council, Boy Scouts of America, 22 Cal.2d
436, 139 P.2d 941 (1943); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950). Since the piecemeal
cutting of the immunity rule is doing away with the reason behind
the rule, why not do away with the rule completely? England and
Canada have repudiated the rule of immunity. Hillyer v. St.
Bartholomew Hospital, 2 K.B. 820 (1909); Lavere v. Smith's Falls
Hospital, 35 Ont. L.R. 98 (1915).
In the preservation of the trust funds, are the courts really
accomplishing their object-that of preserving the benefit of the
charity to the public? Where there is immunity there is likely
to be neglect. Would it not be more to the interest of the public
and of the donor's intent if the charity were held to a standard
of care and efficiency than if the trust funds were protected at the
expense of the former? C. M. H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TREATIEs-THE UNITED NATIONS CHAR-
TER AS THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND.-Plaintiff, a Japanese alien,
brought this action against the State of California to determine
whether land bought by him had escheated to the state under the
provisions of California's Alien Land Act. Basically, the act pro-
vided that any alien who was eligible to become a citizen of the
United States could own land in California; but those who were
ineligible for citizenship could hold agricultural land only when
a treaty so stipulated. No treaty between the United States and
Japan had given this right. The superior court found that the
property bought by the plaintiff had escheated on the date of the
deed. Held, on appeal, that the statute was unenforceable because
it was contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter,
which, as a treaty of the United States, became the supreme law of
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the land. Judgment reversed. Sei Fujii v. California, 217 P.2d
481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
In a petition for rehearing, the state maintained that since
Japan was not a member of the United Nations, the plaintiff was
not entitled to the benefits guaranteed by the Charter. Held, that
the Charter guaranteed equal rights to all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion; and therefore plaintiff was en-
titled to the guarantees. Petition for rehearing denied. Sei Fujii
v. California, 218 P.2d 595 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
The Alien Land Act which was under attack in this case
was enacLed in 1920. The principal reason for its passage was to
prevent the acquisition by alien Japanese and Chinese of agricul-
tural land since it was difficult for the Western farmer to compete
with the Oriental. The California statute was upheld in Porter-
field v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1935); and a similar Washington statute
was held valid in Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
In these cases the Supreme Court held that the due process and
equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment had not been
violated. The Court said in the Terrace case that each state had
the right, in the absence of a contrary treaty provision, to deny
aliens the right to hold land within its borders. This right stems
from the common law rule that an alien had the right to take land
by act of the parties, but that he had no capacity to hold it against
the state. Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (U.S.
1813). It was found by the Court in the Porterfield case that the
distinction between aliens eligible to become citizens and those
who were ineligible was a reasonable classification, and was not
a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
At the time of the enactment of the Alien Land Act there was
a large number of aliens who were ineligible to become citizens of
the United States. Practically all Asiatics were in this ineligible
class. In recent years, and especially during World War II, these
restrictions have been relaxed, until today Japanese are virtually
the only people excluded from citizenship.
It was contended that since Japanese are practically the only
people excluded from citizenship, the Alien Land Act discriminates
against them solely on the basis of their race. The court in the
principal case refused to question the constitutionality of the act
under the 14th Amendment because it was bound by precedent.
Instead, the court declared the law unenforceable on the ground
that it was contrary to the principles set forth in the United Na-
tions Charter. The decision of the court is justified if the Charter
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [1950], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol53/iss1/7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
became supreme law of the land upon ratification by the Senate.
U. S. CONST. Art. VI, § 2, provides that treaties made under the au-
thority of the United States become the supreme law of the land,
and as such, supersede any state statute in conflict with it. How-
ever, it appears that whether the terms of a treaty are binding upon
the courts upon ratification by the Senate depends upon whether
a treaty is self-executing or executory. Chief Justice Marshall
pointed out the distinction in Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (U.S.
1829). In that case he said that a treaty is to be regarded by the
courts as equivalent to an act of Congress when it operates by
itself, without the aid of further legislation. When the terms of
the treaty import a contract, and either of the parties promises to
perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political,
and not the judicial department. Before this type of treaty can
become a rule of the court, the legislature must execute the con-
tract.
The question is whether the applicable provisions of the
United Nations Charter are self-executing. Article 55 (c) provides
that the members of the United Nations shall promote "universal
respect for, and observation of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion." In Article 56 the members pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action to achieve the purposes set forth in
Article 55. United Nations Charter, 59 STAT. 1035 et seq. This
language implies that future legislation, putting the pledge into
effect, was contemplated. If so, the Charter on the point in ques-
tion would not be self-executing, and would not supersede state
statutes. This line of reasoning becomes more convincing in view
of the rule that when reasonably possible the provisions of a treaty
will not be construed to override state laws. Guaranty Trust Co.
of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
An alternative method of declaring the alien land laws unen-
forceable is presented by an Oregon supreme court decision in
Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949).
Oregon had an alien land act similar to the California statute. In
this case the court declared the Oregon law unconstitutional on
the ground that it'violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the 14th Amendment. It said that although the state
had the power to regulate the ownership of land by aliens within
its borders, this regulation had to conform to the due process and
equal protection clauses. By pointing out that Japanese were now
virtually the only people covered by the law, the court showed
that the classification under the law discriminated by reason of
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race, and therefore violated the 14th Amendment. Although this
case was referred to in the principal case, it was not followed be-
cause the court believed it to be based on a misinterpretation of
recent Supreme Court decisions in Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.
633 (1948), and Takahasi v. Fish &e Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
"(1948).
The decision in the principal case by the California district
court is unique in that it is the first time a law in the United States
has been declared unenforceable by virture of the United Nations
Charter. What the outcome of the case will be if it is appealed
is, of course, a matter of conjecture. However, if the decision is
carried to its logical conclusion, an interesting problem arises.
Does the holding mean that upon ratification of the Charter all
discriminatory practices in the United States became illegal? It
could be argued that if the Charter is a self-executing treaty many
of the provisions of the proposed Civil Rights legislation, aimed
at preventing discrimination, became effective upon its ratification.
It is unlikely that anything of this nature was contemplated by the
Senate when it ratified the Charter. The necessity for legislation
to provide machinery for enforcement and penalties for the viola-
tion of the Charter provision, would tend to show that it is not
self-executing on this point.
A possible solution to this problem might be reached by
holding the Charter to be self-executing in relation to the Cali-
fornia statute since further legislation is unnecessary; but executory
in relation to the Civil Rights program since enabling legislation
is necessary. On the former point, no positive action is required,
while in the latter case it is. R. E .M.
HABEAS CORPus-FEDERAL COURTS-CERTIORARI TO UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT AS A STATE REMEDY.-Petitioner was denied
a writ of habeas corpus by the district court because of his failure
to apply for certiorari to the United States Supreme 'Court after
the state supreme court had squarely passed on a federal constitu-
tional question presented. Held, on certiorari, affirmed. Certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court is a part of the state remedies
under § 2254 of the Habeas Corpus Chaptcr of the judicial Code,
62 STAT. 967 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1948). Darr v. Burford, 70
Sup. Ct. 587 (1950) (5-3 decision).
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